“There are two things in intelligence. There is the absence of intelligence—well, that’s a mistake in the profession—and the exploitation of intelligence.”
– Jean-Pierre Augé for RFI, 5th July 2024
by Soany Pougala
In March 2024, retired French colonel Jean-Pierre Augé published a memoir on his 20-year long career in Africa as a member of the French intelligence services agency, the DGSE, the Directorate General for Exterior Security.
The book’s title “Afrique Adieu”, meaning “Farewell Africa”, references Augé’s perception of an ever more distant growing Africa, in light of the then recent coup d’états in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso which had overthrown French-backed governments.
One bizarre yet almost comical aspect of the book is that despite official narratives from the French government that treats all accusations of exploitation, corruption and neocolonialism as fictitious illusions imagined by a bitter African youth, Augé lays in plain sight just how deeply involved the French government has been in African politics for the past decades.
Whether in Togo, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, or Niger, Augé takes the reader along the numerous missions which had been assigned to him on African soil.
At times, his work ‘simply’ involved contacting African journalists, intellectuals and activists, convincing them to work as informants for the DGSE.
At other times, he would write reports of his field observations, giving insights on the current political, social and sometimes military situation to provide his government with a better understanding of the potential opportunities that could be seized to further France’s interests.
Perhaps more interestingly, is his self-admitted close relationship with many African heads of state, who themselves were well aware of his role as a French secret service agent. Behaving as their close aid, security and advisor, he would directly report their every move and word to what he refers to as “Paris”, a euphemistic metonymy which almost distracts the reader from realizing that African governments are under constant surveillance by the French state.
However, the relationship is displayed as somewhat consensual. The DGSE officers do not force themselves in, but are in fact invited into the lives of the heads of state, ministers, friends and family members of the ruling authorities. In his own words, when describing how he met then Chadian president Idriss Déby:
“It was at the end of a day in July 1994 that Idriss Déby received me. Before his eyes was the letter of introduction from Commander Augé, signed by the DGSE. My host asked me about the details of my installation, listened to my first impressions, and asked me if I had any needs that the presidency could meet.” (p.191)
From the nonchalant way of writing, one would almost believe that this was the meeting of two old friends reuniting after a long time apart, or of a relative moving to live with a member of his extended family.
The tragedy is so grotesque that it becomes almost comical: a close and intimate relationship between a country’s leadership and the secret services officer of a foreign nation. Anywhere else in the world, we would call this high treason – but in Africa, it is just another summer day.
As years went by, Augé became the Chadian president’s closest advisor. The intimacy of this relationship is justified during the 1996 presidential elections. Up until now, Chad had never held democratic elections. In order to appeal to the international community (and international institutions’ potential aid), it was deemed important to give the illusion that the French-supported president had any legitimacy to rule.
Before the public release of election results, Jean-Pierre Augé received a confidential call from one of his colleagues informing him that Idriss Déby won the first round with over 60% of votes. Of course, France wanted Déby to win. But overshooting the election results to such a degree was sure to attract suspicion.
Worried that the credibility of their puppet leader would suffer in result, the French state sent instructions to Jean-Pierre Augé: make sure that the Chadian president agrees to a second round of elections so that his victory appears more “democratic”. Despite initial resistance, Idriss Déby eventually gives. He organises a second round which he unsurprisingly wins. Having successfully changed the president’s mind, Augé gloats:
“In Chad today, France-Africa is alive and well, and my position as ‘special’ advisor is fully justified!” (p.224)
Idriss Déby would go on to govern until his assassination in 2021, two months after celebrating 30 years in power. He was then immediately succeeded by his son, Mahamet Déby, who shared in his memoir that he was sent to study in a French military preparatory school in Aix-en-Provence right after finishing high school. The BBC reports:
“In his book, he recalls his stay in his father’s village, when a French army helicopter landed in search of him. A few hours later, he found himself standing in front of his father, who informed him of his new departure for France.”
The French state, through its army and intelligence agency, has groomed and raised not only this generation of leaders, but also the next ones to come.
That is the perversion of the matter. It would be foolish to believe that this situation has only been caused by the isolated acts of a corrupt few, and that removing a country’s figurehead would suffice in dismantling the foreign intelligence networks which have penetrated the African political sphere. In a publicly shared book, Augé admits that the DGSE has relations with politicians, journalists, activists, professors, and the families of their most important targets. Such relations are hereditary. They renew themselves so that even as individuals change, get promoted, move or die, the power structure maintaining African countries’ subjugation remains.
When Jean-Pierre Augé walked into Idriss Déby’s office to introduce himself to him and begin his new work, he did not need to re-introduce his employer nor his purpose. The relationship has been established beyond its enacting individuals, who only aim to reproduce it.
It is abundantly clear that Africa suffers a crisis of national security. To say that we have damaged information channels or that we have suffered from information leaks is a distortion of reality. Our administrations and governments are completely transparent. France knows what our treasury looks like, what our industry’s weaknesses are, which political agents are disruptive and which are malleable, what is the personality of those in power, as well as the personality of their spouses and children, what they eat for breakfast and what they disdain at dinner.
Yet, we know nothing about France, or any other Western country for that matter. While we are transparent, other countries remain opaque. No one can win a card game with a revealed hand, not when other players’ cards remain hidden.
This asymmetry of information means the death of African strategy, diplomacy, and any form of relevancy in the international system.
What is the point of giving great speeches to the people claiming that the death of imperialism is near, showing bravado when discussing Western countries while simultaneously letting them in close enough to hear the heartbeat of our nations?
We must track down all the ways in which our political intelligence has been compromised, and prevent foreign agents from exploiting such viable and intimate information at our expense and to their own benefit.
It seems inevitable that to survive this war of information in which we find ourselves on the losing end, we will need to develop our own counter-intelligence strategy, aiming to cease the information hemorrhage which we have politically evolved into.
Soany Pougala
September 25, 2025
Sources:
1. Jean-Pierre Augé. (2024). Afrique Adieu Mareuil Editions.
2. Jean-Pierre Augé. (2024, July 5). Il est très difficile de déterminer le jour d’un putsch [Interview]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1xcRFekxKBY
3. BBC Afrique, (2024, April 28) “Mahamat Déby: portrait d’un général qui veut diriger le Tchad”, https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/czd83vvpqgqo
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